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IMPLEMENTATION AND UTILIZATION OF SECURITY 






Security assistance encompasses a broad assortment of tools to include the sale or 
transfer of military equipment, grant funds, and education and training, all of which aim 
to build partner nation capacity. This project examines trends among the U.S. Foreign 
Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, and Russia’s Military-Technical Cooperation 
Programs. Regional program trends are examined and further analysis is provided on the 
ground-level operational impact and the implications of changing levels of support in 
Indonesia, Lebanon, and Turkey. The effect on these countries’ engagement with the 
United States and other international providers is also analyzed. These programs are 
important means to obtain access to and influence militaries in allied and friendly nations. 
While these programs support the implementing nation’s foreign policy and national 
security objectives, and provide benefit to the recipient nation, there are concerns 
regarding competing interests. Given the ever-changing global environment, security 
assistance programs will remain essential to counter security threats and continue to 
evolve. Provider nations must carefully consider the costs and benefits of such assistance. 
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Countries with poorly trained and poorly resourced militaries are typically unable 
to maintain control of their territory or create a stable and safe environment for their 
citizens (Shapiro, 2012). This situation often creates regional instability, with conflicts 
and unrest spilling over borders into neighboring countries. Working with partners, a 
nation is better able to increase the capability of its armed forces. Participation in joint 
exercises or operations helps professionalize military forces and improves their ability to 
contribute to global security. 
While some countries undoubtedly bear greater portions of the cost of global 
security, it is important to the overall success of the mission to empower other nations to 
contribute to the mission. With conflicts occurring around the world, it is not possible for 
a small number of nations to be everywhere all the time. Partner nations, with whom 
others cooperate in pursuit of a common goal, must be prepared to share in the burden of 
contributing to regional security. Many countries do not have the resources or capability 
to ensure national security and contribute to regional security. More often than not, 
countries require assistance to enhance military capability before they are able to play a 
greater role. Major global powers implement security assistance programs that aim to 
increase the capability of the recipient nation’s armed forces. 
Security assistance is one of the primary methods by which nations can assist 
others in building capacity. A more capable partner nation is a valuable asset when it 
comes to addressing common security challenges. Capable partner nations are better able 
to protect their country and contribute to joint or coalition efforts. 
Such programs are additionally viewed as an important means to obtain access to 
and influence militaries in allied and friendly nations. Programs are designed to support 
the implementing nation’s foreign policy and national security objectives. In conjunction, 
programs also provide benefits to the recipient nation.  
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One of the early examples of U.S. security assistance is the lend-lease program 
implemented during World War II. The United States supplied food and defense materiel 
valued at more than $40 billion to Allies during World War II (Gates, 2010). Much of 
this assistance was in the form of tanks, trucks, and artillery (Gates, 2010). Immediately 
following World War II, assistance in the European region focused on rebuilding efforts. 
However, as tensions increased between the Eastern and Western superpowers, there was 
a rush to prepare for the potential fallout. 
During the Cold War, security assistance was often used to offset the enemy’s 
influence and secure base privileges (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2011). It focused on building 
military capability to gain an advantage over the other bloc. One of the key components 
of the Nixon Doctrine was to help partner nations resist Soviet insurgency without 
putting United States’ boots on the ground (Gates, 2010). The Soviet Union, seeking to 
expand Communist influence, consolidated its control over the Eastern Bloc.  
Implementation of security assistance programs transitioned after the Cold War. 
Emphasis in U.S. programs shifted towards wider policy goals, such as good governance, 
human rights, and global security (Cottey & Forester, 2004). The array of recipient 
countries broadened to include countries that had previously been on opposite sides of the 
spectrum. 
To increase counterterrorism efforts after 9/11, in some cases, the United States 
and other countries have pledged vast amounts of security assistance to countries despite 
opposing values. Even countries with authoritarian regimes and poor human rights 
records have received assistance to fight rising threats (Cottey & Forester, 2004). The 
United States and other provider nations must carefully consider the costs and benefits of 
such assistance, as the consequences can be detrimental. Strengthening or supporting an 
oppressive regime can result in the loss of the hearts and minds of the local population. 
Another potential risk is that insurgents are embedded in the armed forces receiving 
equipment or training, which would result in increasing the capability of opposing forces. 
In Iraq, as has been seen, U.S.-supplied equipment abandoned by Iraqi Security Forces 
fall into the hands of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters (Bender, 2014). 
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Successful security assistance programs can pay significant dividends for both the 
implementing and recipient nation. The implementing nation may reap benefits, such as 
access to military bases in the recipient country, support in coalition environments, 
increased economic benefits, and a partner that can better contribute to global security. 
The recipient nation receives equipment or training designed to help its armed forces 
defend sovereign territory and contribute to global or regional security. While the 
recipient country may initially be receiving defense equipment, it often leads to a long-
term relationship (Shapiro, 2012). Equipment requires training, maintenance, spare parts 
and follow-on support throughout the life cycle of the equipment, which is often provided 
by the original equipment manufacturer or implementing nation. The resulting long-term 
relationship can be both positive and negative. While it helps to build and support 
diplomatic ties between countries (Shapiro, 2012), it also tends to makes countries 
sensitive to overreliance on one supplier or provider nation.  
As primary objectives for security assistance have evolved over time, countries 
have been forced to build more cooperative relationships with former or potential 
enemies (Cottey & Forester, 2004). It is not uncommon for countries to use security 
assistance programs from multiple nations. Implementing countries may have competing 
interests that recipient nations must strategically balance. Decisions can impact future 
engagement and relationships with other countries.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This project addresses several questions related to the implementation and use of 
security assistance programs.  
The research questions addressed throughout this project are: 
1. What are the trends between the U.S. Foreign Military Sales, Foreign 
Military Financing, and Russia’s Military-Technical Cooperation 
Programs? 
2. How do changes in program support affect a recipient nation’s 
engagement with the United States and other donor countries?  
3. What are the impacts of security/military assistance programs in select 
countries? 
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C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Security assistance encompasses a broad assortment of tools to include the sale or 
transfer of military equipment, grant funds, and education and training aimed to build 
partner capacity. U.S. security assistance includes 12 major programs: Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Construction Services (FMCS), Foreign Military 
Financing Program (FMFP), leases, Military Assistance Program (MAP), International 
Military Education and Training (IMET), drawdowns, Economic Support Fund (ESF), 
peacekeeping operations (PKO), international narcotics control and law enforcement 
(INCLE), nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs (NADR) and 
direct commercial sales (DCS) (Defense Security Cooperation Agency [DSCA], 2015). 
This project primarily focuses on FMS and FMF programs because they account for the 
vast majority of U.S. security assistance and are more direct than other forms of 
assistance. In 2014, the estimated budget for the FMF program, which provides funding 
for foreign military sales and training, was over $5 billion (“FMF Account Summary,” 
n.d.) out of a total security assistance program budget estimated at $8.5 billion (Epstein, 
Tiersky, & Lawson, 2014). An FMS agreement is a government-to-government 
agreement for the sale or transfer of defense equipment or services. FMS sales exceeded 
$30 billion in 2014, (DSCA, 2014), which were funded largely with national funds or 
through the FMF program.  
Other countries have implemented similar programs. Russia’s military technical-
cooperation (MTC) program was developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
includes activities relating to the exports and imports of military equipment. These 
programs enhance partner nation capacity and support Russia’s defense industrial base. 
Chapters II and III of this study compare the U.S. Foreign Military Sales and 
Foreign Military Financing, and Russia’s Military Technical Cooperation programs. This 
section examines the legislative evolution, objectives, and procedures for program 
implementation. It also identifies key organizations involved in the implementation and 
management of these programs, and provides an analysis of regional trends of 
engagement and overlap in recipient nations.  
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The following three chapters explore the use of security/military assistance 
programs in select countries. The three countries included in this study are Indonesia, 
Lebanon, and Turkey. The analysis provides background information, examines the use 
and implementation of programs, and the ground level operational impact. This analysis 
includes examining the type of equipment received, the effect on capability, and how 
these programs may impact the recipient nation’s engagement with the United States and 
other donor countries. 
The final chapter provides the conclusion and demonstrates that security 
assistance programs benefit the recipient nation by building partner nation capacity and 
help the implementing, or donor nation, to achieve national objectives. In addition, it 
offers recommendations for areas of further research. 
 
 6 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 7 
II. U.S. AND RUSSIA BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Security assistance programs are widely viewed as an important means to obtain 
access to and influence militaries in allied and friendly nations. Security assistance is 
designed to support foreign policy and national security objectives of the implementing 
nation. The United States and other donor nations have created programs that allow 
eligible governments to receive or purchase various types of equipment. These programs 
attempt to build partner nation capacity and enable national military forces to defend their 
sovereign territory and strengthen their ability to fight alongside coalition forces. 
Guidance for specific security assistance programs comes from military strategic plans 
and is based upon policies issued by various government organizations. In addition, these 
programs support domestic defense industry. 
While for much of the past century Russia and the United States have been on 
opposite sides of the political spectrum, globalization has led to an increase in the number 
of countries that receive security assistance from both nations. This assistance may 
partially be explained as many Eastern European countries have joined or aspire to join 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union. The rising threat of China 
is also a key security concern. These countries were traditionally aligned with the Soviet 
Union and as they lean West, the United States becomes a favored supplier. After 9/11, 
the United States became increasingly engaged with countries in the Middle East that had 
been accustomed to Soviet or Russian defense equipment. While security assistance from 
the United States has started or increased for a number of nations in the Middle East, 
many also still import equipment from Russia. Countries that received equipment from 
both Russia and the United States in the 2012–2013 time period include the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, and 
Azerbaijan (Smith and Gould, 2014). 
Both the U.S. and Russian security assistance programs support the national 
defense industry. Shrinking national defense spending has many companies looking to 
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international sales as a means to maintain revenue and production lines. The United 
States and Russia serve as the world’s largest defense exporters. The United States 
accounts for approximately 30 percent of global arms exports, while Russia accounts for 
approximately 27 percent (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 
2015). U.S. defense exports increased by approximately 20 percent from 2005–2009 and 
2010–2014. Russian defense exports increased by nearly 40 percent during the same 
period (SIPRI, 2015). Much of Russia’s defense industry is state controlled and is a 
matter of national pride. The country’s declining economy further motivates Russia to 
ensure the success of its domestic defense industry. 
This chapter examines the U.S. FMS and FMF Programs and Russia’s Military-
Technical Cooperation Program. It studies policy objectives, legislative evolution, and 
key organizations involved in the management and implementation of these programs. 
Each of these factors impacts a security assistance program’s implementation. 
B. UNITED STATES 
1. Background and Legislation 
During World War II, the United States institutionalized its pledge to promote 
peace and security. Early military and security assistance focused on building military 
capability to gain an advantage over other nations in the Eastern Bloc. The end of the 
Cold War, and the formation of new nations, brought about a transition in the U.S. 
security assistance programs that resulted in an emphasis on supporting democracy, good 
governance, human rights, and enabling nations to deal better with their own security 
challenges (Cottey & Forester, 2004). Ongoing security assistance efforts aim to support 
U.S. foreign policy goals and to gain access to and the ability to influence foreign 
military forces. 
The export of defense equipment is meant to promote interoperability between the 
United States’ and the recipient countries’ armed forces, which strengthens their ability to 
fight alongside U.S. forces in coalition environments. It also aims to reduce the likelihood 
that American forces will be called upon to respond to regional security problems.  
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Security assistance is further targeted to support U.S. foreign policy and national 
security objectives. The 2015 National Security Strategy identifies several areas of focus, 
to include combating the threat of terrorism, building capacity to prevent conflict, and 
strengthening the United States’ alliance with Europe (White House, 2015). Detailed 
security assistance direction comes from U.S. military strategic plans and is based upon 
policies and guidance issued by both the Department of State (DOS) and the Department 
of Defense (DOD). 
The reporting, control and oversight of security assistance programs is primarily 
governed by two laws. 
1. Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), as amended (22 U.S.C. 2151, et. seq.) 
2. Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended (22 U.S.C. 2751, et. seq.). 
As stated in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (amended through Pub. L. No. 
113-76), the primary objective of U.S. foreign aid is “the encouragement and sustained 
support of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources 
essential to development and to build the economic, political, and social institutions 
which will improve the quality of their lives” (Foreign Assistance Act, Sec 101, Part 1) 
The FAA gives the Secretary of State responsibility for “the supervision and direction of 
economic assistance, military assistance, and military education programs” (Section 
622(c), Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended). 
The AECA authorizes the transfer or sale of defense articles and services through 
the government-to-government FMS program or through the licensed commercial sales 
process (Arms Export Control Act of 1976). It sets the standards of eligibility for receipt 
articles and services delivered under this act (Arms Export Control Act of 1976). 
As stated in the Act, defense articles and services shall be sold to friendly 
countries solely for: 
1. “Internal security” 
2. “Legitimate self-defense” 
3. “Preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” 
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4. Enabling the recipient to participate in “regional or collective 
arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations” 
5. Enabling the recipient to participate in “collective measures requested by 
the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security” 
6. Enabling the foreign military forces “in less developed countries to 
construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the 
economic and social development of such friendly countries.” (Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976, Sec.4.) 
A defense article includes technical data in any form. Models, mockups, and other 
similar items are considered technical data (International Traffic in Arms Regulation 
[ITAR], 22 C.F.R. §120.6). A “defense service” is defined as assistance or training, “in 
the design, engineering, development, production, processing, manufacture, use, 
operation, overhaul, repair, maintenance, modification, or reconstruction of defense 
articles, whether in the United States or abroad” (ITAR, 22 C.F.R. §120.9). 
2. Key Organizations 
The large number of authorities and organizations involved in implementing 
security assistance programs often leads to confusion in partner nations and can impact 
their decision with which countries they choose to engage. No single central agency or 
government organization exists to oversee and coordinate all U.S. security assistance. 
The responsibility for the planning, development, and implementation of the program is 
shared by many organizations. Key organizations include Congress, DOS, DOD, DSCA, 
and military departments.  
a. Congress 
Congress holds the “purse strings” for security assistance programs and has the 
authority to regulate the transfer of United States government (USG) property. Congress 
appropriates security assistance as part of the state, foreign operations and related 
program legislation (Tarnoff & Tiersky, 2015). FMS that are anticipated to meet criteria 
or thresholds must be submitted for Congressional review prior to offering the equipment 
or service formally to the FMS customer.  
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b. Department of State  
The DOS is responsible for the management and supervision of U.S. security 
assistance programs. The Secretary of State is in control of the general direction of 
security assistance programs, including the decision of whether a country will receive 
security assistance and the dollar value of the program (DSCA, 2015). The lead DOS 
bureau for FMS matters is the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM). The PM bureau 
is responsible for transfer approvals and Congressional notification and serves as the 
DOS liaison to the DOD for related matters (DSCA, 2015). 
c. Department of Defense 
The Secretary of Defense has the primary responsibility for establishing 
“priorities for the procurement, delivery, and allocation of military equipment.” (DSCA, 
2015) The DOD implements the procurement or transfer of eligible articles and services 
through the FMS program and is responsible for end use monitoring to ensure 
compliance with export control and security requirements. The DOD’s security 
cooperation office, located within the embassy of each country, is responsible for 
interfacing with the nation on security assistance matters (DSCA, 2015). These efforts are 
conducted in close coordination with the DOS. 
d. Defense Security Cooperation Agency  
The DSCA is the DOD agency that administers and provides guidance to the 
DOD for the execution of all security assistance and cooperation programs. The agency is 
under the authority and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). 
The DSCA is responsible for developing security assistance procedures and serve as the 
DOD liaison with regards to security cooperation legislation (DSCA, 2015). They 
oversee the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), which 
provides education and training to personnel involved in security assistance programs. 
e. Military Departments  
The MILDEPs serve as advisors on security cooperation matters related to their 
services. They are responsible for “conducting military education and training and sales 
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of defense articles and services to eligible foreign countries and international 
organizations” (DSCA, 2015). They provide “technical information and data on weapons 
systems, tactics, doctrine, training, capabilities, logistic support, price, source, 
availability, and lead-time for each proposed FMS sale” (DSCA, 2015). MILDEPs serve 
as implementing agencies (IAs) in the execution of foreign sales and training.  
3. Security Assistance Programs  
U.S. security assistance programs are varied. The two primary security assistance 
programs that permit the sale or transfer of defense equipment are the FMS and Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) programs (DSCA, 2015). Combined, these programs account 
for the majority of security assistance. Purchases can be made with the country’s own 
funds or with FMF funds. Partner nations may receive FMF funds through a grant or 
direct loan. Alternatively, countries may also purchase articles or services directly from 
U.S. industry via DCS. Regardless of whether a country is purchasing through FMS or 
DCS, the same export control laws apply.  
a. Foreign Military Sales Program Overview 
The FMS program allows eligible foreign governments to purchase defense 
equipment, services, and training from the USG. A FMS agreement is a government-to-
government agreement with the USG choosing to provide the requested equipment or 
service to the receiving country from current stocks or through a contract with U.S. 
defense industry.  
Countries and international organizations are considered eligible for the use of the 
FMS program by presidential determination (or delegated authority) when the sale or 
grant will strengthen U.S. security and promote world peace (DSCA, 2015). Presidential 
determination is frequently delegated to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense 
for security/military assistance matters. The recipient must agree to certain conditions, 
such as not to transfer title or possession to anyone, not to use for a purpose other than 
the reason furnished unless they have obtained appropriate permission, and to maintain 
security of the article (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961). 
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Reasons a country may lose (or be denied) eligibility status include support to 
terrorists, Communist governance (unless a waiver is approved), violation in terms of use 
agreement with the United States, default in payment to the United States, failure to take 
steps in preventing the production and transiting of illicit drug, prohibition or restriction 
of U.S. humanitarian assistance, severing of diplomatic relations, tax on U.S. assistance, 
recruitment or use of child soldiers, a government whose elected head of state is deposed 
by military coup or decree, or engagement in consistent gross violations of human rights 
(DSCA, 2015). 
A significant number of steps and approvals are required throughout the FMS 
process. It may be several years before the recipient country receives the equipment or 
service. The FMS process begins with customer identification of its requirement and 
research of its options. Then, the customer prepares a letter of request (LOR), requesting 
a price and availability (P&A) response, or a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) 
response. A P&A is an estimate of the cost and availability of the requested equipment or 
services, while a LOA is a formal USG offer to sell the items. Once the LOA is signed by 
the customer and returned with a deposit, the FMS case is considered to be in the 
implementation phase (DSCA, 2015). Delays throughout the FMS process are a frequent 
source of recipient nations’ complaints. 
Equipment procured through the FMS program has usually already been approved 
by the DOD for full rate production and is used by the U.S. military. This prior approval 
and use minimizes the risk of interruption or cancellation of production, and also 
provides confidence that follow on support and spare parts will be available over the life 
of the equipment.  
Other benefits of the FMS program include cost savings due to economies of 
scale and U.S. responsibility for the procurement process. Equipment purchased through 
the FMS process is on the same production line as lots for U.S. forces. The increased 
quantity can often result in a lower price, which benefits both the U.S. and recipient 
nation. The USG is responsible for the negotiation with U.S. industry, which provides 
some additional assurances that a foreign buyer would not ordinarily receive. For 
example, the USG is entitled to certified cost and pricing data under the Truth in 
 14 
Negotiations Act (Truth in Negotiations Act 10 U.S. Code § 2306a). It is extremely 
unlikely that a U.S. company would release this information to an international customer 
buying equipment through DCS. 
The purchasing government is responsible for paying all costs associated with the 
sale to include an administrative fee to pay the cost to execute the sale in addition to the 
cost of the equipment or service. Effective in 2012, the FMS administrative surcharge 
was reduced to 3.5 percent of each FMS case (Landay III, 2012). Congress establishes 
the ceiling for the account each year (DSCA, 2015).  
The excess defense articles (EDA) program allows for the sale or transfer of 
defense equipment using FMS authority. Eligible foreign governments may purchase 
excess equipment at a reduced or no cost basis through this program. Recipient nations 
often receive equipment “as is” and “where is” and are responsible for transport and 
repair costs. While DSCA facilitates coordination and approval of each request, military 
departments identify their excess equipment and combatant commands indicate potential 
recipient countries (DSCA, 2015). 
b. Direct Commercial Sales Overview 
An alternative to using the FMS program is to purchase equipment or services 
directly from the manufacturer. DCS are commercial export sales through which eligible 
foreign governments purchase defense equipment, services, and training directly from the 
U.S. defense industry. A DCS sale results in a contract between the purchasing nation 
and the U.S. contractor. While DOD does not administer these sales, the DOS is 
responsible for authorizing the export license. Not all equipment, services, and training 
are available to foreign customers via DCS as the USG is able to designate specific 
equipment or training as FMS eligible only. This designation is typically reserved for the 
most advanced and sensitive military technology.  
C. RUSSIA 
Russia’s MTC program grew out of the military industry’s central role during the 
Soviet era. While the production of military equipment was a thriving business during the 
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Cold War, the levels of equipment production decreased soon after the dissolution of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). However, in recent years, Russia has grown 
into the world’s second largest exporter of defense equipment, and most of its MTC 
program appears to be focused on maintaining its military industrial base.  
1. Background and Legislation 
Throughout the Cold War, developing military capabilities was a national priority, 
and the Soviet Union was able to sustain a huge military industrial complex. The fall of 
the USSR and the economic shift from communism to capitalism forced changes in the 
MTC program. As Russia struggled with the massive economic transition, the country 
needed capital to keep the economy afloat and develop the next generation of weapon 
systems. As a result, the MTC program was expanded and exports to foreign nations 
increased dramatically. 
As defined in the Russian Military Doctrine of 1993, military-technical 
cooperation includes the “export and import of weapons and military hardware or 
technology to foreign countries, the results of scientific and technical activity in the 
military domain; sending military advisers on official trips; conducting joint scientific-
research and experimental design work to create new models of weapons and military 
hardware; and providing technical assistance in the establishment of military facilities 
and defense industry” (Federation of American Scientists, 1993). 
The goals of Russia’s MTC program include strengthening Russia’s global 
military-political position, raising hard currency for the state’s defense needs, 
maintaining the level of Russia’s defense export potential, research and development for 
defense industries, and providing support for the personnel of military institutions and 
organizations (Federation of American Scientists, 1993, edict No. 1833). 
Authority for the military-technical cooperation program is outlined in the 
following legislation: 
1. Law 114-FZ “On the Military and Technical Cooperation of the Russian 
Federation with Foreign States” 
2. Decree 1062, “Issues of Military-Technical Cooperation between the Russian 
Federation and Foreign Countries.” 
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Law 114-FZ, “On the Military and Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation with 
Foreign States,” is the regulation governing military-technical cooperation between 
Russian companies and foreign countries. It specifies the responsibilities of government 
and executive bodies. Military-technical cooperation is defined as the “activities in the 
sphere of international relations relating to the manufacturing, import and export of 
military purpose products. Military-purpose products are defined as “weapons, materiel, 
works, services, intellectual property rights, and military-technical information” (Federal 
Law No. 114-FZ, 1998, Article 1). 
Decree 1062, “Issues of Military-Technical Cooperation between the Russian 
Federation and Foreign Countries” designates the federal executive bodies responsible for 
coordination and control in the area of military-technical cooperation between the 
Russian and foreign countries. The decree removes some of the stages of approval to 
promote the ease of use of the MTC program.  
2. Key Organizations  
a. The Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation  
The Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) is responsible 
for the overall control and supervision of military-technical cooperation. The FSMTC is 
required to submit MTC proposals to the President and relevant ministries within the 
government and ensure implementation of policy and regulation related to military-
technical cooperation (“Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation of Russia 
Objectives,” 2011). 
b. Military-Industrial Commission  
The military-industrial commission (MIC) serves as the administrative body for 
both the Defense Ministry and military-industrial complex. It was created in 2006 to 
centralize management of military industry and is responsible for the “oversight of long-
term strategy and planning, serves as a monitoring mechanism on pricing of defense 
projects, and monitors the restructuring of the military-industrial complex” (“Military-
Industrial Commission,” 2011, paragraph 3). 
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c. Rosoboronexport 
Rosoboronexport is a federally owned company that has exclusive rights to export 
fully assembled military items and is under the control of the MIC. It accounts for 
approximately 85 percent of Russia’s defense exports (“Rosoboronexport,” 2013). 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
There are a number of countries with security assistance (or similar programs) 
that are designed not only to obtain access to and influence militaries, but also support 
domestic industry and help to ensure foreign partners are equipped and trained to work 
toward common security goals. This chapter examined the U.S. FMS and FMF programs 
through which eligible nations may purchase defense equipment and services, and 
Russia’s Military-Technical Cooperation Program.  
The intent of both the Russian and U.S. programs are very similar, with a strong 
focus on strengthening their global strategic position and supporting defense industry. 
Given the complex relationship between the two nations, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
security assistance programs have historically concentrated on different countries. The 
post-Cold War era has seen an increase in the number of countries using both U.S. and 
Russian programs. In addition, emphasis has shifted from the prior East/West conflict to 
countering widespread transnational threats, such as terrorism. 
Both Russia and the United States have numerous laws and structures in place to 
oversee, coordinate, and implement their security assistance programs. The following 
chapter examines regional trends in the implementation of programs. These programs 
continue to evolve as the world is faced with changing threats. Given the global 
environment, strong defense industries, and national military capabilities, it is likely that 
both the United States and Russia will remain key players in the implementation of 
security assistance/security cooperation programs. 
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III. UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA TRENDS 
This chapter provides further analysis of the U.S. FMS and FMF, and Russia’s 
Military-Technical Cooperation programs, which all permit the sale or transfer of defense 
equipment. It examines regional trends and the top 15 recipient nations of both the FMS 
and MTC programs from 2006 to 2013. Regional trends in the U.S. and Russian 
programs are fairly similar, likely due to security concerns in the Middle East and Pacific 
in the post-9/11 world. While regional commonalities do surface, significantly less 
overlap occurs in levels of engagement with the same countries within any given region, 
particularly with the U.S. FMF program. The trends demonstrate strategic relationships 
between implementing and recipient nations. 
A. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM  
1. Overview 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the FMF program provides grants and loans 
to eligible foreign governments for the purchase of U.S. defense equipment and services 
through the FMS or the DCS program. The primary objectives of the FMF program are to 
improve the military capabilities of partner nations, enhance interoperability between 
U.S. and foreign armed forces, and thus, enable them to participate better in coalition 
efforts, and support the U.S. defense industrial base. Congress appropriates FMF funds as 
part of the DOS International Affairs Budget (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2011), and the DOS 
allocates the funds to eligible nations.  
2. Regional Trends 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, FMF objectives vary by region. From fiscal year 
(FY) FY06 through FY13, FMF objectives at the regional level remained largely 
unchanged. FMF funds in the Near East South Asia (NESA) region focused on promoting 
regional stability and ensuring influence of moderate governments. FMF assistance 
focused primarily on increasing interoperability with U.S. forces, supporting coalition 
counter-terrorism efforts, and increasing Israel, Egypt, and Jordan’s defense capabilities 
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(Department of State, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). FMF assistance 
in Europe and Eurasia focused on providing assistance to new and prospective North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members and supporting coalition partners 
participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (Department of State, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). FMF 
in the Western Hemisphere focused on equipping and training military forces to combat 
drug production, control borders, and approaches to the United States, and participate in 
coalition operations (Department of State, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012). In the East Asia and Pacific region, funds targeted counter-terrorism efforts and 
promoting military reform. FMF funds in Africa focused on counter-terrorism efforts and 
increasing peacekeeping, border, and maritime security capabilities (Department of State, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
Figure 1.  Regional Trends in FMF Allocation. 
 




Figure 2.  Regional Trends (Excluding NESA) in FMF Allocation. 
 
After Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2013). Historical facts book. Retrieved 
from http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/historical_facts_book_-_30_september_20 
13.pdf 
The NESA region receives a significantly higher allocation of FMF funds than the 
other regions as a direct result of the Camp David Accords (DSCA, 2013). During the 
negotiations in 1978, one of the primary factors of disagreement for the Israeli and 
Egyptian peace agreement was control over the Sinai Peninsula. Israel considered the 
Sinai a buffer against future attacks, and to convince Israel to return the land, the United 
States promised significant aid that would allow the Israelis to purchase advanced 
military equipment. An understanding with Egypt was also reached that would give 
Egypt sufficient aid to ensure a regional balance of power (Sharp, 2015). Israel and Egypt 
accounted for approximately 85 percent of the global FMF budget and just over 96 
percent of the region’s FMF allocation (DSCA, 2013). FMF funds were also allocated to 
Jordan and Pakistan to enhance interoperability and support joint efforts in the war on 
terrorism.  
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FMF funds in the African region were primarily used to increase peacekeeping 
capability, improve maritime and border security, and support counterterrorism programs 
(“Security Assistance in Africa,” n.d.). Tunisia was the largest recipient of FMF funds in 
the region. Programs in Tunisia were aimed at equipment deficiencies in military aviation 
to help combat Islamist extremism (IHS Jane’s, 2014a). Morocco had the second largest 
FMF program valued at approximately $65 million (DSCA, 2013). The FMF budget for 
Africa increased slightly from approximately .66 percent of the total FMF budget from 
FY06–FY09 to .89 from FY10–FY13. 
The East Asia and the Pacific region’s FMF funds are aimed to combat 
international crime and promote military reform (“Security Assistance in East Asia and 
the Pacific,” n.d.). The Philippines received the highest allocation of funds in the region, 
followed by Indonesia (DSCA, 2013). The Philippines purchased two decommissioned 
U.S. Coast Guard cutters, which became the largest ships in the Philippine Navy (Lum 
and Dolven, 2014). In early 2015, the Philippines Armed Forces signed a deal to receive 
two Lockheed Martin C-130T Hercules transport aircraft. Approximately 20 million 
dollars of the sale is said to be paid through the FMF program (IHS Jane’s, 2015a). FMF 
funds decreased from approximately 1.1 percent of global FMF allocation from FY06–
FY09 to .88 percent from FY10–FY13 (DSCA, 2013). 
The allocation of FMF funds to countries in Europe and Eurasia declined slightly 
from approximately 2.6 percent of global FMF allocation from FY06–FY09 to 
approximately 2 percent from FY2010–FY2013 (DSCA, 2013). Funds were primarily 
used to support defense reform efforts and assist prospective NATO members in the 
preparation for NATO ascension. Poland, Georgia, and Romania received the highest 
allocation of funds with programs focused on military modernization and reform 
(“Security Assistance in Europe and Eurasia,” n.d.). 
FMF funds allocated to the Western Hemisphere region focus on helping train and 
equip militaries in countries near the U.S.’ southern border (“Security Assistance in the 
Western Hemisphere,” n.d.). The region’s FMF allocation decreased from approximately 
2 percent of global FMF allocation from FY06–FY09 to 1.2 percent from FY10–FY13. 
Colombia and Mexico accounted for just over 90 percent of the region’s FMF funds from 
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FY06 through FY13 (DSCA, 2013). Colombia’s FMF allocation has steadily declined as 
security and development conditions have improved and greater responsibilities were 
transferred to national control (Beittel, 2012). 
B. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM 
1. Overview 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the FMS program allows eligible foreign 
governments to purchase defense equipment, services, and training from the USG. An 
FMS agreement is a government-to-government agreement with the USG to provide the 
equipment or service to the receiving country through existing inventory or through 
contract with the U.S. defense industry. Alternatively, countries may purchase equipment 
or services directly from U.S. industry through DCS. Purchases can be made with the 
country’s own funds, FMF funds, or other grant funds. 
2. Regional Trends 
As would be expected given the significant allocation of FMF funds, NESA 
accounted for the highest dollar value of FMS agreements from FY06–FY13 (DSCA, 
2013). It can also likely be attributed to economic growth and regional security 
challenges. The East Asia and Pacific region accounted for the second largest portion of 
FMS agreements from FY06–FY13 (DSCA, 2013). It is representative of their growing 
economies and the rising threat of China. While the dollar value of FMS agreements in 
Europe and Eurasia declined from FY06–FY13 (DSCA, 2013), many traditional 
European partner nations use DCS for major programs. Africa accounted for the smallest 
overall value of FMS agreements from FY06–FY13, followed by the Western 
Hemisphere (DSCA, 2013). Countries in both regions have relatively small defense 
budgets. See Figures 3 and 4.  
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Figure 3.  Regional Trends in FMS Agreements. 
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13.pdf 
Figure 4.  Regional Trends (Excluding NESA) in FMS Agreements. 
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from http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/historical_facts_book_-_30_september_20 
13.pdf 
The NESA region accounted for the highest value of FMS agreements from 
FY2006–FY2013. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates account for the majority 
with large-scale procurements valued at nearly $73 billion. The peak in 2012 represents 
Saudi Arabia’s F-15 fighter aircraft agreements valued at nearly $30 billion. Israel’s 2010 
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peak may be explained by its 2010 FMS agreement for F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. It was 
the first country to procure the F-35 through the FMS system, which represents further 
opportunity for technology sharing and increased opportunities to further develop its 
national industrial base (“Global Participation,” n.d.). The value of FMS agreements 
signed by NESA countries increased from 53 percent from FY06–FY09 to 65 percent of 
global FMS agreements from FY10–FY13 (DSCA, 2013). 
Australia leads the East Asia and Pacific region in FMS agreements, accounting 
for nearly $17 billion dollars from FY06 through FY13. Major Australian procurements 
included the F-18 Super Hornets (“Australia’s 2nd Fighter Fleet,” 2014), C-17 heavy-lift 
aircraft, and related training and maintenance expenses (“Heavy Lifting Down Under: 
Australia’s Growing C-17 Fleet,” 2014). It was followed by Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Japan with programs each valued at approximately $7 billion during the same time period 
(DSCA, 2013). While the dollar value of FMS agreements in the East Asia and Pacific 
region increased significantly from FY06–FY09 and FY10–FY13, the percentage 
remained proportional at approximately 21 percent of the overall value of FMS 
agreements.  
Europe and Eurasia accounted for approximately $33 billion of FMS agreements 
from FY06–FY13. While the value of FMS agreements decreased, many projects were 
funded through the DCS program. The United Kingdom accounted for the highest portion 
of FMS agreements valued at $5.7 billion, followed by Turkey, with agreements valued 
at nearly $5 billion. Canada, which DSCA categorizes as part of Europe, accounted for 
nearly $4 billion of FMS agreements. Major U.K. programs included acquisition of C-
17s, Reaper unmanned aircraft and the joint Rivet program (surveillance aircraft) (Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2011). The percentage 
of FMS agreements in Europe and Eurasia decreased from approximately 22 percent in 
FY06–FY09 to 12 percent from FY10–FY13 (DSCA, 2013). While FMS agreements 
have decreased, seven countries in the region (Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) use DCS for the F-35 procurement. Many 
countries in this region also serve as implementing or donor nations of security 
assistance. 
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The African region accounted for the smallest value of FMS agreements, with 
programs valued at approximately $3.2 billion from FY06–FY13 (DSCA, 2013). This 
small value is likely due to the smaller nature of African national defense budgets and 
types of equipment they are procuring. Morocco accounted for 86 percent of the FMS 
spending in the region. Morocco procured F-16 aircraft and related equipment and 
support valued at $2.4 billion in 2008 (“Morocco’s Air Force Reloads,” 2014). Overall, 
the region’s FMS agreements decreased from approximately 3.4 percent in FY06–FY09 
to 0.4 percent from FY10–FY13 (DSCA, 2013). 
Colombia and Brazil accounted for approximately 65 percent of FMS agreements 
in the Western Hemisphere. “Plan Colombia,” implemented in 2000, is an extensive 
program designed to support the “War on Drugs” (IHS Jane’s,” 2014b). Colombia’s 
program peaked in 2007, with agreements valued at approximately $403 million. Brazil’s 
program peaked in 2008 with agreements valued at approximately $325 million (DSCA, 
2013). The portion of FMS agreements signed by countries in the Western Hemisphere 
decreased from approximately 2.6 percent from FY06–FY09 to 1.5 percent from FY10–
FY13 (DSCA, 2013). 
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show the top 15 FMS buyers based on cumulative dollar value 
of agreements from FY06 through FY13. Eight of these countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, 
Iraq, Israel, Egypt, India, Pakistan, and Kuwait) are in the NESA region. Four of these 
countries (Australia, Taiwan, Korea [Seoul] and Japan) are in the Asia Pacific region and 
three (the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Canada) are considered part of Europe and 
Eurasia. Many of these countries are also providers of security/military assistance.  
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Figure 5.  FMS Agreements—Top Two Countries.  
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Figure 6.  FMS Agreements—NESA Countries (Excluding Saudi Arabia) in 
the Top 15.  
 






Figure 7.  FMS Agreements—Other Countries in the Top 15. 
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As shown in Figure 8, the top five FMS buyers account for more than 50 percent 
of all FMS agreements. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Australia use national funds rather than 
grant money to fund their FMS agreements (DSCA, 2013). 
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Figure 8.  Top Five FMS Buyers. 
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13.pdf 
C. RUSSIA’S MILITARY-TECHNICAL PROGRAM 
1. Overview 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the production of military equipment was a 
thriving business in Russia during the Cold War; however, levels of equipment 
production decreased soon after the dissolution of the USSR. In recent years, Russia has 
expanded its capability and grown into the world’s second largest exporter of defense 
equipment. Most of its MTC program appears to be focused on maintaining and 
expanding its military industrial base. 
2. Regional Trends 
The fall of the Soviet Union brought about a division in the Soviet defense 
industry amongst the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Countries in the CIS 
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include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. While the MTC program is focused on arms exports, Russia is 
increasingly trying to take advantage of Soviet era defense assets located within CIS 
countries. Russia has implemented bilateral military-technical cooperation programs with 
many of the CIS countries. Many of these agreements have established joint companies 
(IHS Jane’s, 2015b). While these joint companies give Russia access to capabilities that 
would otherwise be lost (and cheaper materials and labor), they also allow other nations 
to take advantage of Russia’s position and connections in the global arms market (IHS 
Jane’s, 2015b). See Figure 9. 
Russian arms exports have risen fairly consistently in value. While growth has 
slowed down in the past two to three years, exports are expected to increase as back 
orders are filled, as shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 9.  Russian Arms Transfers. 
 
After SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/data 
bases/armstransfers 
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Figure 10.  Regional Trends in Russian Arms Transfers. 
 
After SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/data 
bases/armstransfers 
Russia has expanded military-technical cooperation programs with countries 
throughout the Middle East and Asia. Larger programs are focused on “arms export, 
licensed production, servicing of military equipment, and training of personnel” (Basu, 
2001, p.9). The NESA region accounted for approximately 45 percent of Russian arms 
exports. The top three recipient nations in the region were India, Syria, and Egypt (SIPRI, 
2015). East Asia and the Pacific accounted for approximately 29 percent of Russian arms 
exports. China and Vietnam accounted for approximately 78 percent of arms transferred 
to this region (SIPRI, 2015). 
India and China have an extensive relationship with Russia and account for more 
than 50 percent of Russia’s armament exports (Smith & Gould, 2014). Sales to China 
dropped off around 2006 due to Russia’s discovery that China attempts to reverse 
engineer Russian systems illegally (IHS Jane’s, 2015b). However, partially as a result of 
the U.S. and EU military sanctions, Russia has redeveloped military ties with China (IHS 
Jane’s, 2015b). Recent negotiations include additional engines for China’s combat 
aircraft, discussions about the potential purchase of Su-35 fighter and the Triumf air 
defense system (IHS Jane’s, 2015b). In May 2015, the countries signed an agreement to 
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collaborate on the development of an Advanced Heavy Lift helicopter (IHS Jane’s, 
2015b). 
Recent global events have had a significant impact on Russia’s foreign arms sales. 
The overthrow of the regime in Libya and unrest in Syria has resulted in the loss of 
several billion dollars of contracts (IHS Jane’s, 2015b). Between 2005 and 2008, Russia 
wrote off approximately $15 billion dollars of Syrian and Libyan debt with the 
expectation that these nations would then procure Russian military equipment (IHS 
Jane’s, 2015b). It is unclear how much of this equipment was delivered prior to the arms 
embargo. Russia also serves as a supplier to Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, which are 
familiar with Soviet era equipment. 
Russia has started expansion into the developing African and Latin American 
markets. Africa accounted for approximately 14 percent of Russian arms transfers from 
2006–2013 and the Western Hemisphere accounted for approximately 5 percent. Many of 
these countries with relatively small defense budgets were not able to finance deals 
promptly. As a result, Russia has continued to use “creative” financial arrangements, 
such as debt forgiveness and access to oil and gas reserves (IHS Jane’s, 2015b). Algeria 
accounted for 80 percent of Russia’s arms transfers to the African region (SIPRI, 2015). 
Venezuela is the largest importer of Russian equipment in South America and accounted 
for approximately 90 percent of arms transfers to the region (SIPRI, 2015). 
Europe and Eurasia accounted for approximately 5 percent of Russia’s arms 
transfers. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Belarus accounted for approximately 70 percent 
of region’s transfers. Programs in Belarus and Kazakhstan consist of arms transfer and 
joint design or co-production of defense equipment (Basu, 2001). The conflict in Crimea 
has impacted Russia’s defense supply chain. Many Russian defense companies rely on 
parts from Ukraine, which have slowed down or stopped. Consequently, the ability of 
Russian companies to produce and deliver final products has been impacted (IHS Jane’s, 
2015b). As a result, Russia has increased its military cooperation with Belarus; however, 
Belarus has fewer major defense suppliers (IHS Jane’s, 2015b). 
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Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan receive Russian assistance in building 
their national armed forces (Basu, 2001). In 2012, Russia acquired a significant stake in 
Kyrgyzstan’s Dastan Joint Stock Company, which produces the NPO Region VA-111 
Shkval torpedo (IHS Jane’s, 2015b). A number of programs are focused on repair and 
maintenance of former Soviet equipment (Basu, 2001). 
In recent years, given its economic and financial challenges, Russian defense 
industry has generally been more willing than in the past to cooperate with the West. One 
of the primary goals of Russia’s MTC is to generate funding for research and 
development (R&D) of new systems. Much of the financing is achieved through the 
marketing and sales of Russian systems on the international market.  
Figures 11, 12, and 13 show the top 15 recipients of Russian arms from 2006–
2013. 
Figure 11.  Russian Arms Transfers—Top Two Countries. 
 
After SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/data 
bases/armstransfers 
Figure 12.  Russian Arms Transfers—NESA Countries (Excluding India) in 
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Figure 13.  Russian Arms Transfers—Other Countries (Excluding NESA and 
China) in the Top 15.  
 
After SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/data 
bases/armstransfers 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
While for much of the past century Russia and the United States have been on 
opposite sides of the political spectrum, transnational threats, such as terrorism and the 
rising threat of China, has led to its neighbors increasing national defense capabilities. As 
a result, the implementation of security/military assistance programs has increased, 
particularly in the Middle East and Asia. Regional trends of U.S. and Russian 
engagement overlap; however, the top recipient country in each region (with the 
exception of NESA) receives a relatively insignificant, if any, portion of military 
assistance from the other country. Implementing and recipient countries often have 
competing interests that must be considered when determining levels of engagement. A 
changing level of engagement and/or restriction on programs can have a lasting impact 
on future relations with a recipient nation. Successful engagement benefits both the 
implementing and recipient nation that is further explored in the following country 
chapters. 
Figures 14 and 15 compare the value of U.S. FMS agreements and Russian arms 
transfers. 
Figure 14.  U.S. FMS Agreements by Region. 
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from http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/historical_facts_book_-_30_september_20 
13.pdf 












Figure 15.  Russian Arms Transfers by Region. 
 
After SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/data 
bases/armstransfers 
From 2006–2013, the NESA region accounted for the largest portions of U.S. 
FMS agreements and Russian arms transfers. NESA accounted for approximately 60 
percent of U.S. FMS agreements and 45 percent of Russian arms transfers. With the 
exception of Iran and Syria, some level of U.S. engagement occurred in the NESA 
countries to which Russia transferred arms. 
East Asia and the Pacific accounted for the second highest region for both the 
U.S. and Russian programs, which comprised approximately 21 percent of U.S. FMS 
agreements and 28 percent of Russian arms transfers. From 2006–2013, Russia 
transferred arms to four countries: China, Laos, North Korea, and Myanmar/Burma 
(SIPRI, 2015), where no FMS or FMF engagement took place (DSCA, 2013). Indonesia, 
a key partner in maritime security and counterterrorism efforts in the East Asia and 
Pacific region used the U.S. FMS and FMF and Russian MTC programs. 
The programs, however, take a different direction in Europe and Eurasia. This 
region accounted for the next highest level of engagement in the U.S. FMS program 
(DSCA, 2013), and the smallest recipient of Russian arms (SIPRI, 2015). U.S. FMS and 













FMF engagement focused on long standing and new NATO partners, while Russia’s 
engagement focused more heavily amongst the CIS nations. Turkey, a strategic U.S. ally 
in the region, is also a recipient of Russian arms.  
In comparison to the United States, Russia transferred a significantly larger 
portion of military equipment to Africa (SIPRI, 2015). While the African region 
accounted for the smallest percentage of FMS and FMF programs, U.S. engagement is 
increasing with programs focused on counter terrorism and peacekeeping. Algeria, the 
third largest recipient of Russian arms (SIPRI, 2015), had limited engagement with the 
U.S. FMS program, and received no FMF funds (DSCA, 2013). 
The Western Hemisphere accounted for the fourth smallest portion of programs 
for both U.S. FMS and Russian arms transfers. Russia’s program with Venezuela, one of 
the few countries with which the United States does not implement a security cooperation 
program (DSCA, 2013), accounted for approximately 90 percent of Russia’s engagement 
in the region (SIPRI, 2015).Venezuela is one of Russia’s most important trade and 
military partners.  
A comparison of engagement levels of the top 15 FMS buyers, and Indonesia and 
Lebanon, is shown in Figure 16. Figure 17 shows the top 15 U.S. arms recipients, and 
Indonesia and Lebanon. The top 15 recipients and Turkey of Russian arms are displayed 
in Figure 18. The top 15 Russian arms transfers, and Turkey, appear in Figure 19. The 
comparison to U.S. programs only includes the FMS and FMF programs. 
Globally, based on the cumulative value of FMS agreements from FY06–FY13, 
the top 15 recipient nations were Saudi Arabia, UAE, Australia, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, 
Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, India, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Pakistan, Kuwait, and 
Canada. Nine of the top 15 FMS buyers also purchased Russian arms from 2006–2013. 
These buyers included the UAE, Iraq, Egypt, South Korea, India, the United Kingdom, 
Turkey, Pakistan, and Kuwait. Of these, only four also receive FMF grant funds. With the 
exception of India, the dollar value of FMS agreements was significantly higher than the 
value of Russian arms transfers. 
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Figure 16.  Top 15 FMS Buyers and Indonesia and Lebanon. 
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Figure 17.  Top 15 U.S. Arms Recipients (and Indonesia and Lebanon). 
 
After SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/data 
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Figure 18.  Top 15 Russian Arms Recipients (and Turkey) 
 
After Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2013). Historical facts book. Retrieved 
from http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/historical_facts_book_-_30_september_20 
13.pdf; SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers 
Figure 19.  Top 15 Russian Arms Transfers (and Turkey) 
 
After SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/data 
bases/armstransfers 
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The top 15 importers of Russian arms were India, China, Algeria, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Syria, Azerbaijan, Malaysia, Egypt Myanmar/Burma, Indonesia, Iran, UAE, 
Uganda, Iraq, and Turkey. The top five importers accounted for approximately 75 percent 
of Russian arms transfers. None of the top five importers of Russian arms overlap with 
the top five FMS buyers, although India (Russia’s top arms importer) purchased nearly 
$6 billion through the U.S. FMS program during the same period. Ten of the countries in 
Russia’s top 15 also used the U.S. FMS program, while seven also received FMF grant 
funds. Egypt, the number nine importer of Russian arms, accounted for the sixth highest 
FMS buyer and received the second largest amount of grant FMF funds during the same 
period. Other countries that used the U.S. FMS and FMF programs were Vietnam, 
Azerbaijan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Uganda, and Iraq. As could be expected, the United 
States does not implement security cooperation programs with several (China, Venezuela, 
Syria, Myanmar/Burma, and Iran) of the top 15 recipients of Russian arms. 
Increased transnational threats have led to broadening levels of engagement. After 
9/11, the United States became increasingly engaged with countries in the Middle East 
that had been accustomed to Soviet or Russian defense equipment. While security 
assistance from the United States has started or increased in the NESA and East Asia and 
Pacific regions, many of these countries also import arms from Russia. The following 
chapters focuses on how specific countries use various security/military assistance 
programs, to include the U.S. and Russian programs, and how changes in the programs’ 




After 9/11, security cooperation between Indonesia and the United States 
expanded. The rebalance with the Asia-Pacific region became a top U.S. priority and the 
focus on past human rights abuses faded (Hiebert, Osius, & Poling, 2013). Since 
resuming security assistance programs with Indonesia, key U.S. policy objectives include 
military reform, capacity building, and increased counter terrorism efforts (Vaughn, 
2011). While Indonesia’s impact on regional security has traditionally been limited, 
security assistance/cooperation programs have enabled greater participation in global 
peacekeeping and maritime security operations. The country utilizes the U.S. FMS and 
FMF and Russian Military-Technical Cooperation programs.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia. Its size and strategic position 
have contributed to the country’s position as an emerging regional power. Since 
independence in 1945, the country’s armed forces, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), has 
struggled with internal separatist movements and insurgencies. After an alleged attempted 
communist coup in 1965, General Suhuarto took control of the country. A subsequent army 
led anti-communist purge left more than 500,000 people dead (Vaughn, 2011). 
The TNI played a large political role during President Suharto’s regime (1967–
1998), and were linked to numerous human rights abuses. While significant economic 
growth occurred, the invasion of East Timor in 1975, and violence surrounding the 
independence referendum in East Timor in 1999, led to tension with the international 
community. While international relationships have improved, past human rights abuses 
occasionally flared up. For example, in 2013, after a group of civilians killed a Special 
Forces soldier in a drug-related brawl, soldiers retaliated by storming the prison and 
killing the detained civilians. While a couple of the soldiers were discharged from service 
and sentenced to jail, after serving a light sentence, the majority were free to return to 
active duty the same year (IHS Jane’s, 2015c). 
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Significant changes have occurred in the role of the armed forces since 1998. The 
national police have been detached from the armed forces. The military no longer has a 
substantial role in day-to-day political activity. In 2004, it relinquished its reserved seats 
in parliament, and active duty personnel are no longer permitted to run for elected 
government positions (IHS Jane’s, 2015c). 
The aftermath of the 2004 tsunami further demonstrated some of challenges the 
TNI faced. The TNI lacked the equipment necessary to distribute supplies to those most 
impacted by the tsunami (J.C., 2012). The United States and other countries provided 
humanitarian assistance to the armed forces to help support their natural disaster relief 
efforts.  
It is widely believed that the defense budget historically covered a relatively small 
portion of the military’s actual costs. The military has traditionally supplemented its 
official budget with revenues from both legal and illicit businesses. A law passed in 2004 
required the military to divest its businesses (IHS Jane’s, 2015d). While some changes 
were made, it is believed that the military is still a stakeholder in numerous businesses 
through foundations and cooperatives (IHS Jane’s, 2015d). 
The majority of the defense budget is allocated to military operations, high 
logistical and maintenance costs for its aging equipment, and improving the welfare of 
TNI personnel (IHS Jane’s, 2015c). In 2009, the commander of the armed forces stated 
that only approximately 35percent of their equipment was operational. The country has 
acknowledged the need to increase its defense budget if it is going to modernize the 
armed forces. 
B. UTILIZATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
Indonesia’s limited defense budget, necessity to improve military readiness levels, 
and geographic location impact its status as a good candidate for security assistance 
programs. Due to the various arms embargoes imposed in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
Indonesia is conscientious of not becoming overly dependent on a small number of donor 
nations. The largest suppliers of defense/military equipment exporters to Indonesia are 
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Russia, the Netherlands, South Korea, France, China, and the United States (SIPRI, 
2015). 
1. United States 
From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, the U.S.-Indonesian security assistance 
relationship was severely strained due to documented armed forces human rights abuses. 
As a result, the United States banned most security assistance programs from 1992 to 
2005. U.S.-Indonesian military relations resumed in 2005; however, programs with the 
Indonesian Army Special Forces were prohibited until 2010, due to their connection with 
human rights abuses (Hiebert et al., 2013). While some security assistance to the Special 
Forces has resumed, this assistance is subject to restrictions. See Figure 20. 
Figure 20.  History of FMS and FMF Programs in Indonesia. 
 




In 2005, the United States lifted the arms embargo on the sale of military 
equipment to Indonesia. That same year, “Congress approved $6 million in grants and 
loans for military equipment and training for the Indonesian Navy” (Hiebert et al., 2013, 
p.7). Human rights groups opposed this action because they did “not feel the armed 
forces had taken sufficient action to end human rights abuses” (Hiebert et al., 2013). 
Despite objections, the United States removed most of the existing sanctions against 
security assistance to Indonesia (Hiebert et al., 2013). 
Indonesia received the second highest allocation of FMF funds, behind the 
Philippines, in the East Asia and Pacific region (DSCA, 2013). FMF funds for Indonesia 
are intended to address challenges in maritime and border security in the Strait of 
Malacca (the main shipping lane between the Indian and Pacific Oceans), provide 
transportation capabilities for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and contribute 
to military reform (“Security Assistance in East Asia and the Pacific,” n.d.). 
After suspension of the FMS program, the program was re-started in 2006 with 
agreements valued at approximately $14 million, the value of the program nearly tripled 
by 2010, and exponentially increased to approximately $575 million in 2013 (Hiebert et 
al., 2013). Agreements peaked in 2012 with an estimated value of more than $700 million 
(DSCA, 2013). Major programs include the acquisition and refurbishment of F-16 fighter 
aircraft and Apache Longbow attack helicopters (IHS Jane’s, 2015c). Other agreements 
include the 2013 procurement of the Raytheon FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank guided missile 
system. The deal includes missiles, command launch units, support equipment, spare 
parts, training, and logistics support (IHS Jane’s, 2015e).  
2. Russia 
Indonesia’s and Russia’s military-technical cooperation began in 2002 (SIPRI, 
2015), primarily because of the U.S. ban on security assistance to Indonesia. Their 
relationship has continued to expand even though U.S. relations have improved. Russian 
banks have financed extensive loans to fund procurement of Russian military equipment. 
A bilateral commission for military-technical cooperation was established in 2005 
(Domashneva, 2013). 
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In 2007, Russia extended a $1 billion loan for the purchase of Russian military 
equipment (IHS Jane’s, 2015e). The loan was designed to supply transport and assault 
helicopters, amphibious armored vehicles, and submarines (IHS Jane’s, 2015e). Some of 
these orders have been canceled due to issues with funding, which continues to be a 
challenge for Indonesia (IHS Jane’s, 2015e). The largest military-technical cooperation 
programs include Mi-35 attack helicopters and Mi-17 medium lift transport helicopters. 
In line with Indonesia’s preference to expand national industrial capability, the Mi-17s 
were assembled in country (IHS Jane’s, 2015e). 
Indonesia received six Sukhoi fighters in 2009 and 2010, announced a follow on 
agreement in 2011, and has outlined an ambitious plan to procure over 100 additional 
aircraft in the next 20 years (IHS Jane’s, 2015e). In 2012, Indonesia signed a contract for 
infantry fighting vehicles with an estimated value of $114 million (IHS Jane’s, 2015c). 
While Indonesia has a fairly robust partnership with Russia, the country has 
declined equipment in the past. In 2014, Indonesia turned down an offer of Russian 
submarines due to the belief that repairs would have been too expensive (IHS Jane’s, 
2015e). 
3. Other Nations 
Indonesia and China established a bilateral “Building a Strategic Partnership” 
plan in 2005. The plan was designed to increase military-security ties between the two 
countries by assisting in the development of defense industry and increasing cooperation 
in the fight against transnational security threats (Storey, 2012). China has sold limited 
amounts of defense equipment to Indonesia in the past 10 years (Storey, 2012). This 
equipment has primarily consisted of anti-ship missiles and air search radars. 
In 2005, Indonesia purchased C-802 anti-ship missiles (ASMs) for $11 million 
and ordered 130 portable surface-to-air missiles the following year. Indonesia also 
purchased C-705 ASMs for its domestically produced guided missile ship (Storey, 2012). 
China agreed to transfer part of the technology to help build Indonesia’s defense 
manufacturing capability. One of the largest Chinese programs was the 2008 procurement 
of Giant Bow twin 23-mm air defense systems (Storey, 2012). 
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The Netherlands supplied four corvettes to Indonesia from 2007–2009. Much of 
their partnership is tied to follow on support related to this procurement (The Hague, 
2012). The purchase of surplus Leopard battle tanks and other vehicles from Germany in 
2012 confirmed a new relationship between the two countries. Indonesia had approached 
Germany, but approval of the procurement was delayed because of German concerns 
over Indonesia’s human rights record (IHS Jane’s, 2015e). These same concerns led to 
the Dutch government’s decision to deny a similar Indonesian request in 2012 to 
purchase surplus tanks (IHS Jane’s, 2015e).  
Indonesia procured light combat Super Tucanos from Brazil that were delivered 
in 2012 (IHS Jane’s, 2015e). The Indonesian government is said to be reconsidering an 
ongoing procurement of additional Super Tucano aircraft. However, tensions between the 
two countries are high due to Indonesia’s execution in 2015 of a Brazilian citizen found 
guilty of drug smuggling (BBC, 2015).  
Indonesia’s relationship with South Korea has grown significantly in the past 
decade. From 2006–2013, South Korea was the third largest defense exporter to 
Indonesia (SIPRI, 2015). Procurements include jet trainer aircraft, armored personnel 
carriers, howitzers, and submarines (IHS Jane’s, 2015e). The submarine procurement is 
designed to develop national industrial capability with the first submarine “to be built in 
South Korea with Indonesian engineers on site, the second built in Indonesia, and the 
third built by a national company” (Tran, 2013, p.5). 
“Indonesia’s geopolitical position within Southeast Asia and the larger East Asia 
region has been increasingly recognized amongst global powers” (Vaughn, 2011, p.6). 
Given the rising Chinese threat, many countries are seeking further engagement in the 
region. Figure 21 shows the comparison of arms transfers to Indonesia from 2006–2013 
(SIPRI, 2015). 
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Figure 21.  Arms Transfers to Indonesia. 
 
From SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/data 
bases/armstransfers 
C. IMPACT 
The construction of an improved maritime surveillance system allows the 
Indonesian government to detect, track, and monitor ships in its territory. This system 
improved the TNI’s capability to counter the threats of piracy, illegal fishing, smuggling, 
and terrorism in and around their maritime borders (Shapiro, 2012). 
Following the 2004 tsunami, the United States sold spare parts for Hercules C-
130 transport planes so that aid could be delivered to victims (O’Brien, 2005). The 
tsunami killed over 130,000 people and destroyed existing infrastructure. Without urgent 
aid, the conditions could have been even more devastating.  
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The acquisition and refurbishment of 24 F-16s has enabled Indonesia to bolster its 
air defense capability. The transfer also served as an instrumental step to increase 
interoperability with U.S. forces (U.S. Air Force, 2014). 
The increased capability of Detachment 88, an elite counterterrorism unit, has 
been a significant accomplishment of the security assistance programs. Detachment 88 
has been responsible for tracking and detaining several terrorists; which includes a lead 
terrorist behind the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta (Vaughn, 2011). 
Indonesia participates in several multinational exercises aimed to promote 
interoperability with other nations’ armed forces. These exercises include participation in 
the largest military exercise in the Asia-Pacific Region, Cobra Gold, which includes 
regional powers, as well as the United States and Australia.  
Indonesia has also hosted several exercises in recent years. In 2011, the TNI co-
hosted the inaugural Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief military exercise with 
the Singapore Armed Forces. In 2013, Indonesia hosted the first Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Counter-Terrorism Exercise aimed to “advance military 
capabilities by exchanging best practices and demonstrating tactics, techniques, and 
procedures” (“United States Mission to ASEAN,” 2013, para. 1). This exercise included 
participants from the 10 ASEAN nations and several dialogue partners. 
In 2011, Russia and Indonesia conducted their first joint exercise focused on 
maritime security (Domashneva, 2013). The two countries’ relationship has continued to 
grow through the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations (“Overview of ASEAN-Russia 
Dialogue Relations,” n.d.). 
Indonesia is a significant contributor to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 
missions. With the exception of the years from 1999–2004, Indonesia has participated in 
nearly all UN peacekeeping missions since 1962 (IHS Jane’s, 2015c). Recent years 
(2009–2014) have seen an average of nearly 2,000 personnel deployed on UN missions at 
any given time (United Nations, 2015). 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Indonesia’s role as an emerging power in South-East Asia has led many countries 
to offer increased security assistance. However, the TNI’s troubled history with human 
rights has impacted international relations. Indonesia has learned from prior experience 
with security assistance programs, and is careful not to rely too heavily on any one 
partner. As the political dimension has improved in Jakarta, security 
assistance/cooperation programs have increased, and the TNI is starting to see the impact 
and develop increased capability.  
U.S. sanctions had a detrimental impact on the armed forces. It was reputed that 
more than half of the Air Force’s aircraft were grounded due to lack of spare parts. 
Largely because of the ban in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Indonesia purchased 
Russian Sukhoi fighters (IHS Jane’s, 2005). 
The country’s desire for transfer of more advanced defense technology and the 
building of the national industrial base relies on the confidence of international partners. 
The extent of ongoing and future security assistance to the Indonesian Armed Forces 
depends, in part, on how the government addresses human rights concerns (Hiebert et al., 
2013). 
As shown in Figure 22, programs with most of Indonesia’s international partners 
have ebbed and flowed over the past decade. Security assistance/cooperation programs 
with the United States, Russia, and South Korea are growing. As the United States and 
other countries rebalance towards Asia, the world will continue to consider the tradeoff 
between human rights concerns and security interests. Developing effective 
counterterrorism cooperation with Indonesia has generated particular interest; however, 
the country must remain committed to the transformation of its armed forces if it is to 
continue to inspire confidence as a reliable partner nation. 
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Figure 22.  International Programs in Indonesia. 
 
After Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2013). Historical facts book. Retrieved 
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U.S. security assistance/cooperation programs implemented in Turkey are 
primarily a result of its geostrategic position. Turkey has demonstrated commitment to 
the NATO alliance by providing support to numerous operations. Security threats, 
particularly in the Middle East, have given the U.S. a strong incentive to maintain 
defense cooperation with Turkey. While political strains have threatened the bilateral 
relationship, the U.S. has been able to sustain access to Turkish bases.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Turkey is a regional power located along NATO’s southern border. Its location at 
the junction between Europe, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union, and the 
balance between western and eastern influences, gives Turkey a unique and valuable 
position. Location has been key to U.S. interests in security cooperation with Turkey. The 
country’s economic growth and transition to a secular government has propelled Turkey 
forward as a potential role model for other nations. 
The country has undergone several periods of political instability and experienced 
poor economic management that undermine security cooperation. The Turkish military 
has carried out multiple coups in recent decades. The first coup was in 1960, a second in 
1971, and a third in 1980 (Zanotti, 2011). Numerous senior military officers have been 
charged with coup plotting in the past three decades (IHS Jane’s, 2015f). As of 2009, 
civil courts are able to prosecute active duty military personnel for “anti-government 
activities, threats to national security, and constitutional violations” (IHS Jane’s, 2015f, 
p.3). Many argue that such reform is necessary to limit the historical high levels of 
Turkish military influence in the government. 
One of the greatest threats to Turkish stability is the separatist Kurdish insurgency 
of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), with whom the Turkish Armed Forces have an 
embattled history. In 1999, Turkey captured the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan (IHS 
Jane’s, 2015f). This capture brought about a significant decrease in insurgent operations. 
Operations increased significantly in 2007, with Turkey calling for the United States and 
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Iraq to help control the number of PKK rebels using the mountainous region in northern 
Iraq as a base (IHS Jane’s, 2015f). The United States agreed to let Turkish Armed Forces 
conduct military incursions in pursuit of PKK forces in the region (IHS Jane’s, 2015f). In 
2008, PKK insurgents successfully attacked a Turkish military outpost (IHS Jane’s, 
2015f). Tensions rose again in 2011 and current peace initiatives do not seem to be 
effective. 
Turkey and Greece have a contentious relationship due to sovereignty disputes in 
the Aegean Sea and the division of Cyprus (Zanotti, 2014). Turkey has militarily 
intervened to protect the Turkish minority in the northern part of the island, even when it 
meant opposing the United States (Zanotti, 2014). Another point of contention in the 
international arena is Turkey’s refusal to recognize the mass killings of Armenians during 
the Ottoman Empire as “genocide” (Zanotti, 2014). Turkey also faces criticism for not 
doing more to stop extremists from using their border crossings to transit into Iraq and 
Syria. All these factors have likely impacted its decision to diversify from more common 
NATO defense suppliers. 
While Turkey has experienced many trials, the country has also managed robust 
economic growth in the past decade and transformed into the world’s 17th largest 
economy (Zanotti, 2011). While Turkey’s economy is doing well, the country does rely 
on trade with Russia for key items, such as natural gas (Bonfield, 2014). Turkey has long 
desired to become a member of the European Union (EU); however, several of these 
issues have impeded the country’s ascension as a member state. 
B. UTILIZATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
Turkey’s strategic importance is in large part due to its social, economic, and 
geographic ties to both the east and west. During the Cold War, Turkey was one of the 
only NATO members that shared a common border with the Soviet Union. The United 
States and Turkey have a long history of security cooperation. U.S. security assistance to 
Turkey aims to increase the interoperability of the Turkish Armed Forces with other 
NATO countries and border security (U.S. Department of State, 2015). 
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Turkey purchases defense equipment from a diverse array of suppliers from 
numerous countries. The United States is currently the largest supplier of defense 
equipment to Turkey; however, Germany and South Korea are relatively close behind 
(SIPRI, 2015). Over the past decade, Germany, South Korea, and Israel have each held 
the top spot some years (SIPRI, 2015). 
Turkey aims not only to be a buyer of defense equipment, but also a seller, which 
thus limits any supplier nation’s power over them. In 2004, a shift in Turkish policy 
placed greater preference on its national defense industry (IHS Jane’s, 2015f). As such, 
Turkey places great emphasis on co-production and technology transfer when buying or 
receiving defense equipment.  
1. United States 
Resulting from its support of Gulf War operations, Turkey was a major recipient 
of U.S. security assistance throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Turkey allowed the United 
States to use its military bases for air strikes, closed the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline, and 
increased troop deployments on the Iraqi border (Zanotti, 2011). Turkey’s role as a 
critical ally has continued given current U.S. operations in the Middle East. Turkey 
serves as an access point for equipment en route to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The 
United States would incur significant additional costs if its forces could not use Turkey as 
a transition point for deployment to the Middle East. 
As displayed in Figure 23, while Turkey received large amounts of funding 
through the mid-1990s, FMF assistance was phased out after 1997 (Robey & 
Vordermark, 2003–2004). The 9/11 attacks led to an influx of operations in the region. 
Given the extent of Turkish support of U.S. forces in past operations, the United States 
expected Turkey once again to allow the United States use of its bases; however, the 
Turkish Parliament denied the request for access. This denial perhaps influenced the U.S. 
decision to reinstate FMF assistance to Turkey. Turkey received approximately $60 
million as part of supplemental FMF funds from 2001 to 2003. Eventually, Turkey 
granted permission for the use of airspace, and also allowed “use of Turkish bases and 
border crossings for troop rotations and transport of non-lethal supplies to and from Iraq” 
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(Zanotti, 2011, p.46). Allocation of FMF funds reached over $30 million in 2004 and 
2005 (DSCA, 2013), before dropping to approximately $14 million in both 2006 and 
2007, and phased out again in 2010 (DSCA, 2013). These funds were used to defray costs 
associated with deploying and sustaining Turkish troops during the ISAF mission (Robey 
& Vordermark, 2004). 
Figure 23.  History of the FMS and FMF Programs in Turkey. 
 
After Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2013). Historical facts book. Retrieved 
from http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/historical_facts_book_-_30_september_20 
13.pdf 
Turkey is one of nine partner countries in the F-35 program. As such, some F-35 
components are expected to be produced in country (“Global Participation,” n.d.). While 
support for the program has wavered as costs have increased, the country is currently 
committed to procure six aircraft (IHS Jane’s, 2015g). It is expected Turkey will procure 
the aircraft through DCS. 
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2. Russia 
As Turkey has sought diversification in military suppliers, the country’s military-
technical cooperation program with Russia has grown in recent years. In 2008, Turkey 
signed a $100 million contract with Rosoboronexport for medium range anti-tank 
missiles and launchers (IHS Jane’s, 2015h). The intent of this deal was to supply Turkish 
Armed Forces, while a national company continued to develop an indigenous system 
(Zanotti, 2011). Russia continues to seek to expand its military cooperation with Turkey. 
3. Other Nations 
Additional major programs include a $3 billion dollar submarine contract signed 
in 2009 with German Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft and Marine Force International 
(HDW-MFI) (IHS Jane’s, 2015h). It was reported that a number of components would be 
produced in country, with industrial participation estimated to reach 80 percent (Zanotti, 
2011).  
In 2001, Turkey issued a $1 billion contract to South Korean company Samsung 
Techwin for Firtina self-propelled guns (IHS Jane’s, 2015h). This contract demonstrated 
Turkey’s diversification of suppliers, as sales from traditional suppliers in Germany and 
the United States declined significantly in the same year (SIPRI, 2015). In 2008, a $400 
million contract was signed between a South Korean and Turkish defense company to 
develop and produce main battle tanks (IHS Jane’s, 2015h). While the contract has 
experienced several delays, Hyundai Rotem is expected to transfer a significant amount 
of technology as part of the deal (Zanotti, 2011).  
China’s Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation (CPMIEC) HQ-9 was 
selected as the winner of Turkey’s 2013 surface to air missile contract. China’s proposal 
reportedly undercut systems offered by the United States, a European consortium, and 
Russia, by approximately $1 billion (IHS Jane’s, 2015h). Turkey’s selection of a Chinese 
company has been seen by some as an entry point for China into the European market 
(IHS Jane’s, 2015h). The HQ-9 would not be interoperable with the NATO defense 
systems already in operation in Turkey. The United States and other NATO partner 
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nations are rightfully concerned about the impact this selection may have on coalition 
efforts (Bekdil, 2015). 
Due in large part to NATO partner concerns, the final decision is pending. 
“CPMIEC is subject to U.S. sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria 
Nonproliferation Act” (Pub .Law No. 106-178, as amended) (Bekdil, 2015, para.6). The 
likelihood also exists that any national companies involved in the project may be denied 
access to U.S. technology or equipment for this or future programs (Bekdil, 2015). The 
extent of technology transfer is reputed to be one of the primary factors for the selection 
of CPMIEC; however, the cost may be too high if it places future programs at risk.  
Historically, Turkey has had a close defense relationship with Israel. From 2001–
2013, Israel was the fourth largest arms supplier to Turkey (SIPRI, 2015). Israeli 
companies have been awarded a number of contracts for the upgrade of Turkish 
equipment. There is also a history of contracts for co-production designed to increase the 
capability of the Turkish defense industry (IHS Jane’s, 2015h). In 2005, two Israeli 
companies were awarded a $190 million contract for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 
Turkey was then able to develop an indigenous UAV (IHS Jane’s, 2015h). In response to 
a request for proposal issued in 2007, a Turkish company won the contract to produce 
mine-protected vehicles with the support of an Israeli firm (IHS Jane’s, 2015h). Relations 
soured in 2010 when Israeli forces raided a Turkish ship attempting to deliver supplies to 
Gaza. This raid infuriated Turkey, which announced that it would suspend military and 
defense trade. Later that year, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized for the 
incident (IHS Jane’s, 2015h).  
Turkey’s diversification of defense suppliers has partially been a result of Turkish 
preference for co-production and transfer of technology. While many countries are reliant 
on donor nation assistance for defense equipment, Turkey’s strong economy has allowed 
it greater choice with which programs (and countries) it chooses to engage. See Figure 
24. 
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Figure 24.  Arms Transfers to Turkey. 
 
After SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/data 
bases/armstransfers 
Supplying nations may have less control of Turkish programs because the country 
has the capability to fund much of its own defense procurement. Turkey’s willingness to 
engage with countries across the spectrum has raised concerns in many circles. Moving 
forward, it will be interesting to see with which countries Turkey decides to align itself 
more closely.  
C. IMPACT 
Turkey is located on the southeastern border of NATO and hosts an early warning 
missile defense radar system (Zanotti, 2014). Significant arms procurement has resulted 
in increased interoperability with the United States and other NATO nations. Turkey has 
also provided humanitarian assistance through NATO operations after Hurricane Katrina 
and the Pakistan Earthquake in 2005. 
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One of the key considerations of U.S. security assistance is access to Turkish 
bases and border crossings. Incirlik Air Base hosts a significant U.S. military presence 
and has been used to support numerous U.S. and NATO operations in the region (Zanotti, 
2014). At the peak of its FMF program in the early 1990s, Turkey provided support to the 
Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Provide Comfort II that provided humanitarian 
support and protection to Kurds in northern Iraq.  
Turkish cooperation has helped to combat terrorism in the region. While Turkey 
initially hesitated to play a significant role in regional conflicts, it has contributed troops 
for humanitarian aid and training of ISAF forces in Afghanistan, and has twice 
commanded the ISAF mission (Zanotti, 2014). In the past several years, Turkey has 
participated in the Eager Lion Exercise that facilitates responses to conventional and 
unconventional threats in the region. Turkey supplies assets to the Blacksea Harmony and 
Operation Active Endeavor missions. These missions contribute to maritime security in 
the Black Sea.  
Turkey’s ability to pay for defense equipment and its preference for co-production 
has helped not only to strengthen its defense industrial base/economy, but also support 
defense industry in many nations. Turkey exports arms to a number of countries, 
including Saudi Arabia and UAE (SIPRI, 2015), and is one of nine partner nations on the 
F-35 program (IHS Jane’s, 2015h). Participation in this project not only leads to greater 
cost sharing, but increases long-term interoperability.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
With its well-trained and equipped armed forces, Turkey is among the strongest 
military powers in the region (Zanotti, 2011). Continued economic growth, increased 
military spending and a developing national industrial base help to ensure Turkey will be 
a key contributor in future regional security matters (Zanotti, 2011). Other nation’s 
apprehensions about civil liberties and secular governance in the country will likely 
continue to impact international relations. 
The extent of U.S. assistance to Turkey has ebbed and flowed, depending in large 
part on operations in Europe and the Middle East. Turkey’s initial decision not to approve 
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the U.S. request to use its bases and border crossing may have been influenced by the fact 
that the United States had stopped providing foreign military financing grants. This 
decision demonstrates the potential impact that the elimination of a security assistance 
program may have on future interactions with a country. Figure 25 shows trends in the 
value of several international programs in Turkey from 2001 through 2013. 
Figure 25.  International Programs in Turkey. 
 
After Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2013). Historical facts book. Retrieved 
from http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/historical_facts_book_-_30_september_20 
13.pdf; SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers 
Turkey has demonstrated its willingness to diversify away from traditional NATO 
defense partners in exchange for a better price or increased technology transfer. Its desire 
to become more self-reliant for design and development of defense equipment can be 
seen as both a positive and negative matter. While increased national defense industrial 
capacity will allow for continued national economic growth, Allies have expressed 
concerns about whom Turkey is willing to partner with to expand their industrial base.  
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VI. LEBANON 
The United States is the dominant security assistance provider to Lebanon. U.S. 
FMF objectives include supporting counter-terrorism efforts and U.N. objectives and 
strengthening border security. Despite opposition forces operating in Lebanon, U.S. aid 
has resulted in improved interoperability, access, and understanding with the Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF). In addition to U.S. assistance, other prominent donors are 
supporting the LAF efforts. The LAF will continue to require security assistance to 
support efforts to maintain national security and stability. Lebanon utilizes the U.S. FMS 
and FMF programs. While Lebanon received arms from the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s, it does not have an active program with Russia.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Lebanon plays an important role in the security and stability of the Levant and the 
broader Middle East. The country has struggled with military occupation and external 
interference in recent decades. Civil war erupted in 1975 over internal ethnic, religious, 
and political differences and external pressure from the Palestinians, Israel, and Syria. 
Signed in 1990, the Taif Agreement brought the civil war to an end (Blanchard, 2014). 
The Saudi government helped broker the agreement, which outlined the disarmament of 
non-government forces and set a timetable for the withdrawal of Syrian Forces. Syrian 
military forces departed in 2005, after a nearly 30-year presence. The United States 
participated as part of multinational peacekeeping force in the early 1980s; however, U.S. 
forces were withdrawn after the October 1983 barracks bombing that killed 241 U.S. 
servicemen (Blanchard, 2014). 
As a result of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004), “which 
declared support for a free and fair presidential election, and called for the withdrawal of 
foreign forces” from Lebanon, Syrian Forces withdrew and a pro-Western government 
came into power (United Nations, 2004, para.1). This change led to a reinstatement of 
U.S. security assistance to the country. 
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The withdrawal of Syrian Forces meant the LAF had to assume responsibility for 
internal security challenges (IHS Jane’s, 2015i). In 2006, Israel began an air and ground 
assault against Hezbollah forces and suspected Hezbollah infrastructure. After a month of 
conflict, the United National Security Council passed Resolution 1701, “which called for 
a permanent ceasefire based on the creation of a buffer zone free of armed personnel 
other than UN and Lebanese Forces in southern Lebanon” (United Nations, 2006). While 
the United States continued to provide security assistance to the country, policy was 
refocused towards building state security forces capable of controlling the territory and 
implementing the aforementioned U.N. Security Council resolutions (Addis, 2011). 
Hezbollah’s more advanced weapons, which historically exceeded the weapons 
capability of the LAF and police, is one of the primary internal security concerns in 
Lebanon. These concerns are driven by the role of Hezbollah in the country. While a 
Hezbollah is a formal political party in the country, they are supported by Iran and are 
considered a terrorist threat by the U.S. and many European countries (Blanchard, 2014). 
While Congress has generally supported extensive security assistance for Lebanon, some 
lawmakers argue that Hezbollah may use U.S. equipment against Israel. Others refute this 
argument by arguing that security/military assistance is a counterweight by strengthening 
the LAF (Blanchard, 2014). 
The LAF has limited capabilities in comparison to its more powerful neighbors. 
Historically, it has been underfunded and underequipped, with a significant portion of its 
budget spent on salaries and benefits for military personnel. As a result, the LAF is 
reliant on international assistance for acquisition, training, operations, and maintenance 
(IHS Jane’s, 2015j). 
The LAF has an ambitious multi-year capabilities development plan (CDP) 
designed to ensure it can fulfill national defense duties. Signed in 2013, the plan details 
priorities, goals, and requirements required to build the capacity of the LAF (Blanchard, 
2014). This plan is particularly noteworthy, as it is reportedly the first attempt by the 
LAF to formulate a strategic vision for its way forward. 
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B. UTILIZATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
Due to a limited national defense budget, the LAF is dependent on international 
military/security assistance. The largest international donors include the United States, 
UAE, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Nerguizian, 2014). As a recipient country, 
Lebanon recognizes that foreign assistance is a political tool and depends on the priorities 
of the donor nation.  
1. United States 
Figure 26 shows the trend of the FMS and FMF programs in Lebanon (DSCA, 
2013). It is not surprising that the peaks in FMS agreements correspond with high value 
FMF budgets in 1983, 2009, and 2012, as FMF funds were used to buy equipment 
through the FMS program.  
Figure 26.  History of the FMS and FMF Programs in Lebanon. 
 





The country was embroiled in a civil war from 1975–1989, and assistance during 
that time focused on training and equipping the LAF (Addis, 2011). Following Syria’s 
withdrawal from the country in 2006, U.S. security assistance has steadily increased. 
More than $400 million of overseas contingency operations (OCO) FMF funds were 
allocated between 2007 and 2010 (“Foreign Military Financing Account Summary,” 
n.d.). These funds are not accounted for in Figure 26 since they are considered part of a 
separate budget for temporary extraordinary costs. 
FMF assistance is limited “to professionalize the LAF and to strengthen border 
security and combat terrorism, including training and equipping the LAF to secure 
Lebanon’s borders, interdicting arms shipments, preventing the use of Lebanon as a safe 
haven for terrorist groups, and to implement United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions” (Blanchard, 2014). Lebanon uses several million dollars of FMF on U.S. 
training each year (White House, 2013). Core programs have focused on training for the 
use of technical equipment and Special Forces. 
When the FMF program resumed in 2006, early assistance to the LAF comprised 
of ammunition and spare parts (Addis, 2011). Assistance gradually expanded in both 
quantity and quality, to include more advanced equipment, such as an armed Cessna 
Caravan to improve air support and surveillance (Addis, 2011). In 2009, several UAVs 
intended to help protect against rocket launches were delivered (Addis, 2011). Lebanon 
also received communications equipment, to include tactical radios and a radio system 
(Addis, 2011). Other large programs include high mobility multi-purpose wheeled 
vehicles and costal security craft (Johnson, 2013). 
The United States has decreased or cut FMF assistance to Lebanon in several 
instances. As mentioned previously, one case followed the barracks bombing during the 
Civil War in the 1980s. Another significant reduction occurred in 2010 when the LAF 
fired upon an Israeli Defense Force Unit performing routine operations near the Israel-
Lebanon border (Addis, 2011). 
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2. Other Nations 
The UAE has a strong relationship with the LAF. UAE Armed Forces assisted in 
mine-clearance operations in southern Lebanon in the 1980s and 2000s (“UAE and 
Lebanon’s Military Bond Becomes Stronger,” 2010). More recently, the UAE has 
provided approximately $150 million in security assistance. Equipment provided 
consisted of IAR-330 Puma and Gazelle helicopters, A-3 tanks, trucks, body armor, 
tactical radios, and various spare parts to “boost the capabilities of the LAF” (Johnson, 
2013). 
The role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a donor nation is fairly new in 
Lebanon. While previously donating approximately $68 million primarily for 
ammunition (Johnson, 2013), in 2013, Saudi Arabia pledged $3 billion to procure French 
armaments for the LAF (IHS Jane’s, 2015k). The procurement of French equipment was 
said to be a snub to the United States, which Saudi Arabia felt was doing too little to help 
the uprising against the Assad regime in Syria. The agreement to provide 24 CAESAR 
155 mm self-propelled howitzers was formally signed in 2014 (Van Tets, 2014). Other 
requested items included Mistral short-range air defense systems, anti-aircraft guns, 
armored combat vehicles, Cougar helicopters, and Combattante fast attack craft (IHS 
Jane’s, 2015j). While officially designed to boost stability in Lebanon, the donation was 
also meant to bolster the Army against Hezbollah (Van Tets, 2014). 
While Saudi Arabia included conditions (such as procurement from France) on 
the donation, the LAF were able to provide input as to the selection of the equipment. 
Evidence suggests that the analysis included life cycle costs and integration 
considerations. Lebanon reportedly turned down offers for France’s attack helicopter, 
tanks, and large ships (“French Weapons to Arrive in Lebanon to Fight IS,” 2015). 
As the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threat in the region has grown, 
Saudi Arabia has continued to increase assistance. The Kingdom announced an additional 
$1 billion for Lebanese security forces in 2014, with nearly half of the donation 
designated for the LAF (Van Tets, 2014). Part of the funding is being spent on U.S. 
armed Cessna aircraft, which will be able to fire Hellfire laser-guided missiles (Van Tets, 
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2014). The recent Saudi pledges account for more than double the estimated annual 
national defense budget.  
As noted in Figure 27, other international donors include Qatar, Poland, France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy (Johnson, 2013). Qatar’s assistance program 
has primarily consisted of helicopters, vehicles, and spare parts, with an estimated value 
of $40 million (Johnson, 2013). Poland’s assistance consisted of small arms and 
ammunition (Johnson, 2013). Germany’s program provided patrol boats, naval radars, 
and related equipment at an estimated value of $12 million (Johnson, 2013). French 
assistance consisted of body armor, sniper rifles, and ammunition (Johnson, 2013). The 
United Kingdom has provided anti-riot equipment and an explosive ordinance disposal 
system (Johnson, 2013). Italian assistance has consisted of vehicles and spare parts 
(Johnson, 2013). 
While the Soviet Union provided Lebanon with limited military equipment in the 
1970s and 1980s, the relationship has not continued with Russia (SIPRI, 2015). This 
discontinuation is likely in part due to Russia’s role as a primary arms supplier to Iran 
and Syria.  
Iran has offered military aid in the form of tank ammunition, artillery, and heavy 
machine guns in both 2011 and 2012; however, the offers were not accepted (IHS Jane’s, 
2015i). Unsurprisingly, Hezbollah expressed support for the deal with Iran. 
Notwithstanding, the UN arms embargo, and integrating Iranian weaponry would have 
proven difficult. Iran is not a viable candidate to support LAF goals of military 
stabilization and within its own borders as it funds the Hezbollah militia (Van Tets, 
2014). 
As shown in Figure 27, the United States accounts for nearly 75 percent of 
international security assistance to Lebanon. Since 2006, the United States has provided 
more than $1 billion in assistance funds. From 1960–2013, the United States and France 
were the two largest arms exporters to Lebanon (SIPRI, 2015).  
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Figure 27.  International Contributions to the LAF. 
 
From Nerguizian, A. (2014). Lebanon at the crossroads. Statement before the U.S. 
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian 
Affairs. 
C. IMPACT 
Security assistance programs in Lebanon have emphasized successful 
implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701 in support of a free 
and fair presidential election, the withdrawal of foreign forces, the creation of a buffer 
zone, and counter terrorism efforts. The LAF has made strides and will continue to 
require international assistance as it works towards these goals. 
Lebanon has improved internal security with the acquisition of modern 
equipment. During the 2007 confrontation with pro-Al-Qaeda militia fighters, the United 
States and several Gulf countries (including Jordan, Egypt, and the UAE) airlifted 
artillery and tank ammunition to the LAF to supplement diminishing supplies. Syria 
supplied T-54/55 tank ammunition, along with artillery ammunition for the LAF’s Soviet 
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origin guns (IHS Jane’s, 2015k). The United States alone flew eight re-supply flights to 
Beirut in May 2007 (IHS Jane’s, 2015k).  
In the same year, Belgium’s minister of defense confirmed an agreement to 
supply Leopard-1 tanks and other armored vehicles to the LAF (IHS Jane’s, 2015k). The 
delivery of the Leopard tanks was put on hold pending permission for the deal from the 
authorities in Germany, where the tanks were manufactured (IHS Jane’s, 2015k). 
Discussions in 2008 focused on the sale of armored vehicles (IHS Jane’s, 2015k). 
Subsequently, Belgium delivered the armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), each 
equipped with a 25 mm cannon, and the M113 ambulances (IHS Jane’s, 2015k). With 
extensive international military assistance, the LAF were able to take full control of the 
area of conflict after several months, but a large portion of the Nahr al Bared refugee 
camp was destroyed (Johnson, 2013).  
Modern communications equipment has better enabled the LAF to remain 
connected throughout Lebanese territory. Previous communications systems were 
incompatible between units and with other government agencies because their primary 
methods of communication were landline or mobile phones that were vulnerable to 
interception and jamming (Addis, 2011).  
Border security continues to remain a significant concern in Lebanon. Receipt of 
numerous helicopters, armored vehicles, and trucks has enabled the LAF to become a 
more mobile force that can better patrol Lebanon’s still porous borders. The LAF has 
captured several high-profile terrorists, including a facilitator for several al Qaeda-
affiliated groups that have carried out suicide bombings in Beirut and other Lebanese 
cities (Blanchard, 2014).  
The LAF has been working to improve force readiness levels and have seen 
significant improvement in this area. The LAF has received extensive equipment 
donations from an array of countries. While the equipment is critical to expanding LAF 
capability, these donations have also created a challenge in terms of maintaining and 
supporting the various types of equipment (IHS Jane’s, 2015i). Equipment is extremely 
expensive to keep operational. It is estimated that approximately 70 percent of the total 
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ownership cost of equipment is in operation and support costs. If these expenses are not 
considered in planning, significant risks arise of not being able to use the equipment 
down the line. 
Since 2008, the LAF and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
have steadily strengthened their cooperation. They have started jointly conducting patrols 
on a daily basis. They also conduct joint exercises at the battalion, sector, and 
headquarters levels focused on a range of scenarios (“UNIFIL Operations,” 2015).  
Lebanon has participated in several of the past iterations of the annual Eager Lion 
Exercise. Eager Lion is one of the largest military exercises in the Middle East region and 
is designed to facilitate responses to both conventional and unconventional threats (U.S. 
Central Command, 2015). Participating nations strengthen partnerships and increase 
military interoperability. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Lebanon has encountered many trials and tribulations since becoming 
independent. The withdrawal of Syrian forces and the Israeli-Hezbollah war have been 
tests in Lebanon’s recent history. Lebanon has found reliable international partners 
willing to provide significant security assistance to support efforts to build a stable and 
secure nation. The capability of the LAF is instrumental in the ongoing efforts to achieve 
these goals. Given the limited national defense budget, international security/military 
assistance is critical to grow LAF capability. Security assistance programs implemented 
by the United States, and recent pledges from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have increased 
significantly in the past decade and must continue to provide funding and modern 
equipment for the LAF to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701 
successfully. Figure 28 shows trends in the value of several international programs in 
Lebanon from 2001 through 2013. 
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Figure 28.  International Programs in Lebanon. 
 
After Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2013). Historical facts book. Retrieved 
from http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/historical_facts_book_-_30_september_20 
13.pdf; SIPRI arms transfer database. (2015). Retrieved from 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers 
Security assistance has evolved from basic supplies of ammunition and spare 
parts following the withdrawal of Syrian forces, to more advanced systems such as 
helicopters, UAVs, and self-propelled howitzers that the LAF requires to fulfill its role in 
ensuring security and stability within its nation. Security assistance providers have 
remained largely unchanged over the past few decades; however, that assistance has 
increased sharply in the past few years. Continuity of recent security assistance programs 




Security assistance programs help build partner nation capacity and serve as a 
mechanism to obtain access to and influence militaries in allied and friendly nations. The 
sheer number and cost of conflicts make it impossible for a limited number of nations to 
carry the full burden of providing global security. Partner nations must be empowered to 
play a role. More often than not, these nations require assistance to increase military 
capability before they are able capable of making a greater contribution. Security, or 
military, assistance programs are one of the primary methods in which a country can 
build partner nation capacity. Capable armed forces are better able to defend their 
countries and contribute to joint operations. The implementing nations gain benefits, such 
as defense industrial growth, greater access in the region, and are better able to achieve 
national security objectives.  
The United States and Russia have two of the largest security/military assistance 
programs in the world. Both programs strengthen the capabilities of the armed forces in 
recipient nations and strengthen the implementing nation’s strategic position. 
Historically, U.S. and Russian programs focused on different countries; however, the end 
of the Cold War and globalization has resulted in countries utilizing programs from a 
larger number of nations. Emphasis has shifted from the more traditional East/West focus 
to countering transnational threats and the rising military power of China.  
Both Russia and the United States have complex structures in place to oversee, 
coordinate, and implement their security assistance programs. Program implementation 
typically involves multiple government organizations and defense companies, who may 
have competing interests. Given the current global environment, strong defense industries 
and national military capabilities, it is likely that the United States and Russia will remain 
key players in the implementation of security assistance programs. The United States 
seems to be significantly more transparent, with the government publishing detailed data 
on security assistance programs online. The Russian data was primarily available through 
secondary sources, such as SIPRI and IHS Jane’s.  
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Regional trends for both U.S. and Russian programs indicate growing engagement 
in the Near East South Asia and East Asia-Pacific regions that can likely be attributed to 
China’s rising threat, from the perspective of both the implementing and recipient 
nations. The United States and Russia are both concerned with China’s rise to global 
power and keen to protect their own interests. Incidentally, countries in the region are 
also extremely anxious about China’s aggression in the South China Sea. From 2006–
2013, countries in these regions accounted for over 80 percent of U.S. FMS agreements, 
(DSCA, 2013), 95 percent of FMF budget allocation (DSCA, 2013), and approximately 
73 percent of Russian arms transfers (SIPRI, 2015). While recipient regions share strong 
similarities, the programs within the regions are more diverse. With the exception of the 
Near East and South Asia, the top recipient country in each region accounts for a 
relatively small portion of security assistance from the other country. This level of 
assistance is a key indicator of foreign policy objectives and demonstrates while 
intersecting regional concerns are occurring, less commonality results at the national 
level.  
The use, implementation, and impact of security/military assistance programs in 
Indonesia, Lebanon, and Turkey were studied. In today’s environment, it is not 
uncommon for countries to use security assistance programs from multiple nations. 
Implementing and recipient countries may have competing interests that must be 
strategically balanced. To have a successful lasting engagement, both sides must benefit 
from the program. Background information, history of security/military assistance 
programs, implementing nations, and operational impact of equipment received are 
analyzed throughout the country chapters. Sufficient planning prior to program 
implementation can help to ensure the recipient nation is able to support and maintain the 
equipment throughout its operating life. Both implementing and recipient nation should 
make efforts to ensure programs are complementary. Suspension, or drastically altering 
the level of engagement with a country, can have a long-term impact on future political 
relations.  
Indonesia is a key partner in counterterrorism and maritime security operations in 
the East Asia and Pacific region that uses the U.S. FMS, FMF and Russian MTC 
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programs. Its size, demographic, and strategic position have contributed to the country’s 
position as an emerging power. The armed forces have been connected to numerous 
human rights abuses that have impacted the implementation security/military assistance 
to the country. While the program has been halted temporary at times, Indonesia’s 
significance to key U.S. objectives in the region has contributed to the reinstatement of 
security assistance programs.  
Indonesia is reluctant to “place all their eggs in one basket,” after previous 
sanctions on the receipt of security assistance. Historically, the United States, Germany, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were the primary suppliers of military 
equipment to Indonesia. Russian military-technical cooperation started in the early 2000s 
when the United States halted security assistance to the country. Arms transfers from 
South Korea and France increased during this time period as well. These relationships 
have continued to expand even though programs with traditional partners have been 
reinstated. From 2006–2013, Russia accounted for the largest portion of arms transfers 
(SIPRI, 2015). The country must remain committed to the transformation of its armed 
forces if it is to continue to inspire confidence as a reliable partner nation. Reverting to 
poor treatment of human rights could have a negative impact on its security assistance 
programs.  
Security assistance programs in Indonesia have helped to improve the capability 
of the TNI. Programs have focused on maritime security, humanitarian and disaster relief, 
and peacekeeping operations. Receipt of modern equipment has helped to counter threats 
of piracy, illegal fishing, smuggling, and terrorism. Indonesia participates in several 
multinational exercises, and in the past few years, has begun hosting exercises focused on 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and counterterrorism. Building the capacity of 
Indonesia’s Armed Forces has resulted in a partner nation able to serve as a significant 
contributor of personnel to UN peacekeeping missions.  
As a NATO member, Turkey has an established defense relationship with the 
United States and other allied nations. Its location, at the junction between Europe, the 
Middle East, and the former Soviet Union, and the balance between western and eastern 
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influences, gives it a unique and valuable position. With its well trained and equipped 
armed forces, Turkey is among the most able military powers in the region. 
While the country has undergone several periods of political instability and 
experienced poor economic management, it has seen significant economic growth in the 
past decade. Turkey’s desire not only to be a buyer, but also a global exporter of military 
equipment, has influenced its use of security assistance programs. Higher preference is 
placed on co-production and technology transfer, which has impacted the nations and 
companies the country chooses to partner with for procurement of defense equipment. 
Turkey has demonstrated a willingness to diversify from traditional suppliers in exchange 
for increasing national defense industrial capability. 
The extent of U.S. security assistance to Turkey has widely varied over the years, 
and is dependent on operations in Europe and the Middle East. Turkey hosts a NATO 
early warning missile defense radar system, and has participated in numerous joint 
operations that have resulted in increased interoperability. The United States has long 
benefited from access to Turkish military bases and border crossings, which have been 
used to support recent operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo. 
Turkey’s ability to use national funds for defense procurement has resulted in a more 
capable defense industrial base and strengthened its national economy.  
Lebanon plays an important role in the security and stability of the Levant, and 
the broader Middle East. Despite opposition forces operating in Lebanon, U.S. aid has 
increased interoperability, access, and understanding with the LAF. In addition to U.S. 
assistance, strong regional partners, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have increased 
assistance to the country. The country has struggled with external pressure from Israel 
and Syria; however, the LAF is becoming increasingly more capable. The United States 
accounts for approximately 75 percent of international security assistance to the country 
in support of LAF efforts to strengthen border security and fight terrorism (Nerguizian, 
2014). One of the primary goals of UNIFIL is to assist the armed forces in restoring its 
authority and securing borders in southern Lebanon. The LAF continues to make 
progress towards building the capacity necessary to fulfill national defense duties. 
 75 
Security assistance programs in Lebanon have helped the LAF progress in its 
efforts assume full responsibility for national defense. Receipt of modern equipment has 
helped improve readiness levels and enabled the LAF to patrol its borders better and fight 
terrorism. It has steadily increased its collaboration with UNIFIL and increased 
participation in multilateral regional exercises. While security assistance providers have 
remained largely unchanged over the past few decades, assistance has increased sharply 
in the past few years, which is likely due to increased regional security concerns.  
The impact of significant changes in levels of engagement is particularly true in 
Indonesia and Turkey. These countries have had significant peaks and drops in levels of 
U.S. security assistance, and in both instances, the decline has led to increased levels of 
engagement with other nations.  
As the transnational threat of terrorism has increased in the past decade, U.S. 
engagement has increased with each of the three countries included in this study. It could 
be argued that counterterrorism efforts have perhaps surpassed human rights concerns in 
implementation of U.S. security assistance programs. Evidence suggests it may be true, 
and administrations must weigh the tradeoffs between such decisions. The rising threat of 
China has also led to increased programs in East Asia and the Pacific, as countries in the 
region aim to increase their national defense capabilities. 
Major global powers implement security assistance programs that not only benefit 
themselves, but also build partner national capacity. A more capable partner nation is a 
valuable asset when it comes to addressing common security challenges. Capable partner 
nations are better able to defend their sovereign territory and contribute to joint or 
coalition efforts. Security assistance programs not only help to build defense 
relationships, but also promote diplomatic ties between countries. Given the ever-
changing global environment, security assistance programs will remain essential 
countering security threats and continue to evolve. 
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Research conducted for this project identified several areas for further 
examination: 
1. Trends in all security assistance programs and their impact on a recipient 
nation 
2. How changes in one security assistance program impact other programs 
implemented by the same nation 
3. Examination of the impacts of security assistance programs for all nations 
in one region  
4. Process improvements in the implementation of security assistance 
programs 
5. The influence a recipient nation can have on the direction of security 
assistance program 
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